From 06edd65c1e01f2c38f80daa6a98f8e2fdb1824a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philipp Muth <muth@seceng.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de>
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 15:50:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] found 2 lines, not enough
---
ACNS/keyexchange.tex | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ACNS/keyexchange.tex b/ACNS/keyexchange.tex
index 06d70f7..bfa3322 100644
--- a/ACNS/keyexchange.tex
+++ b/ACNS/keyexchange.tex
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ We arrive at our decapsulation protocol, executed by a superauthorised set \(S^\
\item Otherwise, \(P_i\) outputs \(E^k\) and finalises its turn.% turn is finalised and the next shareholder continues with \(E^k\) as input from \(P_i\).
\item The protocol terminates with the last shareholder's \(E^{\# S^\ast}\) as output.
\end{enumerate}
-The combination of the PVP and the zero-knowledge proof in steps \ref{step.pvp} and \ref{step.zk} ensure, that \(P_i\) not only has knowledge of the sharing polynomial \(L_{i,S^\ast} f_i\) but also inputs \(L_{i,S^\ast} f_i\paren* 0\) to compute \(E^k\). The precise protocol can be found in \hyperref[fig.decaps]{Algorithm \ref{fig.decaps}}.
+The combination of the PVP and the zero-knowledge proof in steps \ref{step.pvp} and \ref{step.zk} ensure, that \(P_i\) has knowledge of the sharing polynomial \(L_{i,S^\ast} f_i\) and also inputs \(L_{i,S^\ast} f_i\paren* 0\) to compute \(E^k\). We give the precise protocol in \hyperref[fig.decaps]{Algorithm \ref{fig.decaps}}.
% \begin{figure}
% %\begin{tiny}
--
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